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ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to the very limited literature examining the
factors determining tobacco companies’ advertising strategies. The
paper explores whether firms in the UK tobacco market significantly
changedtheiradvertisingexpenditureinthefaceofproposedchanges
totheUKandEuropeanCommissiontobaccoadvertisinglegislation.
The results suggest that changes in legislation have little impact on
firms’ advertising strategies for existing brands, but that legislative
changes impact upon product launch dates. Our results also offer
some information on the nature of firm interdependencies in the UK
tobacco industry.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few studies focus on the factors determining tobacco companies’ adver-
tising strategies, despite the large number of papers that investigate the
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effect of advertising and other variables on tobacco consumption.1 This
short paper contributes to the literature by investigating the implications
of tougher UK and European Commission (EC) tobacco advertising
restrictions on tobacco companies’ advertising strategies, as these firm
strategies remain underexplored in existing research. Specifically, the
paper employs intervention analysis to examine whether changes in
legislation and the threat of such legislation result in firms changing
their tobacco advertising expenditures in the period preceding the en-
actment of the legislation. Intervention analysis has been used widely
in the economics literature, e.g. Enders and Sandler (1996), Lloyd
et al. (1998) and Acutt et al. (2001). However, to the best of our
knowledge,interventionanalysishasnotbeenusedpreviouslytoanalyse
the impact of proposed advertising restrictions.
The paper can be related to a number of existing papers, starting
with Seldon and Doroodian (1989). While they estimate a simultane-
ous model of cigarette demand and advertising expenditures, in their
advertising equation, they include dummy variables to indicate changes
in government policy on advertising media restrictions, concluding that
firmsloweradvertisingexpenditureswhensuchrestrictionsareimposed.
More recently, Keeler et al. (2004) provide some evidence that cigarette
advertising increased in the USA prior to the expected 1998 Master
Tobacco Settlement Agreement. Similar to Keeler et al. (2004), we
investigate whether the threat of future legislation affects advertising
expenditure, but this paper departs from their analysis as, again, they
focus on the role of advertising in a cigarette demand function.
In accordance with the rational addiction framework, it might be pre-
dicted that the expected imposition in the future of enhanced advertising
restrictions will lead to profit-maximizing firms increasing advertis-
ing in the short run, given the long-run implications of encouraging
tobacco consumption.2 However, although admittedly there is much
divergence in the empirical studies of the factors that determine tobacco
consumption, many papers conclude that advertising does not have a
significant effect on demand, including Gallet (1999, 2003), Bardsley
and Olekalns (1999) and Nelson (2006). If this result is accepted, it may
be that rational, profit-maximizing firms do not increase advertising
1 Gallet and Agarwal (1999), Saffer and Chaloupka (2000), Gallet (2003), Nelson (2003)
and Bihari and Seldon (2006) provide recent contributions to this literature. Becker and
Murphy’s (1988) model of rational addiction has also been hugely influential in this area of
research, with a number of studies now modelling cigarette demand specifically within a
rational addiction framework, such as Becker et al. (1994), Bardsley and Olekalns (1999),
Showalter (1999), Baltagi and Griffin (2001) and Sloan et al. (2002).
2 In their theory of rational addiction, Becker and Murphy (1988) discuss the demand
implications of price changes and Becker et al. (1994) discuss the potential pricing policy
responses of tobacco firms to tougher advertising restrictions, anti-smoking campaigns, etc.
However, analysis of the pricing responses of firms to recent changes in the UK and EC
tobacco advertising legislation is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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in the short run prior to changes in advertising legislation coming into
force, as the expected impact on demand may be minimal. Yet, it should
be noted that the result that advertising has an insignificant effect on
demand emerges from studies of determinants of market-level demand.
Seldon and Doroodian (1990) argue that this result implies that cigarette
advertising is predatory. Consequently, it remains uncertain whether
there remains an incentive for individual firms to increase advertising
when threatened with a potential ban, hoping to increase market share at
the expense of that of their rivals. This paper addresses these issues
directly, testing the hypothesis that facing proposed restrictions on
tobacco advertising firms change advertising expenditures significantly
in the period preceding the enactment of the restrictions.
Through the novel use of firm-level data on four firms responsible
for most of the UK cigarette market, we are also able to offer some
preliminary conclusions regarding interdependencies and competition
between firms in the UK tobacco industry. Hence, we are able to build
on the research that explores the nature of competition between firms
in the US tobacco industry, such as Roberts and Samuelson (1988),
Thomas (1989), Seldon and Doroodian (1990), Seldon et al. (1993)
and Bihari and Seldon (2006). Similarly, we are able to contribute to
the literature that discusses the motivations for and effects of product
launches, early examples including Schmalensee (1978) and Kekre and
Srinivasan (1990), in the economics and marketing fields, respectively.
This research remains timely, as there have been a number of at-
tempts by the UK and the EC to introduce legislations regulating
tobacco advertising, but little evidence is available on whether they have
achieved the expected impact. The EC’s Tobacco Advertising Directive
2003/33/EC came into force in July 2005 and the UK Government’s
2002 Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act came into effect on
14February2003;bothrepresenteffortstorestrictfurthertheadvertising
of tobacco products. An earlier attempt of the EC to introduce tougher
tobacco advertising restrictions (EC Directive 98/43/EC) was rejected
by the European Court of Justice in 2000. Meanwhile, in the summer of
1999, the UK Government announced regulations in line with the EC
Directive 98/43/EC, although it decided not to impose the regulations in
December 1999, while awaiting the decision of the European Court of
Justice.Itisthepurposeofthepresentpapertoanalysetheeffectsofthese
legislation attempts on firms’ advertising changes econometrically. This
is done using monthly firm-level tobacco advertising data for the period
1993–2003 and time-series techniques with an intervention analysis
methodology.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section
II, the details of the data set and methodology adopted are provided as
well as the results of unit root testing. The main results on the impact of
proposedadvertisingrestrictionsontobaccofirms’advertisingstrategies
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are given in Section III.1, before some preliminary conclusions on the
nature of competition between firms in the UK tobacco industry are put
forward in Section III.2. Section IV concludes.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Nominal monthly firm-level tobacco advertising data (1993–2003)
were supplied by Nielsen Media Research. These data represent £UK
cigarette, cigar and tobacco advertising and were converted into real
values using the all-item retail price index (1987 = 100), as found on
STATBASE (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/default.asp). The firms in the
analysis were chosen primarily on the basis of the 2006 UK market
shares. The largest three firms, Imperial, Gallaher and Philip Morris,
together accounted for over 92 percent of the market (see Table 1). A
furtherfirm,BritishAmericanTobacco(BAT),wasaddedtothesample.
WhilerelativelysmallintheUKmarket,BATproducesanumberofwell-
known brands that are widely available in the UK and is an important
player in the international tobacco market. The firms’ brands and 2006
market shares are detailed in Table 1, with descriptive statistics relating
to each firm’s £UK advertising expenditure (ADV) reported in Table 2.
The focus of the study was to subject the ADV variable to the method
of intervention analysis. One important advantage of this method is that
it allows us to examine whether tougher UK and EC legislation had
a permanent, an abrupt or a temporary impact on firms’ advertising
strategies. A number of intervention dummy variables were considered.
TABLE 1
Firm information
Firm 2006 market share Brands
BAT 6.2% Stuyvesant, Rothmans
Gallaher 38.2% Benson & Hedges, Silk Cut
Imperial 45.5% Regal, Lambert & Butler, Richmond




Variable: ADV Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
BAT 0 58,989 5349 14,112
Gallaher 0 1,771,501 530,669 453,104
Imperial 0 1,137,862 187,852 222,501
Philip Morris 0 500,365 56,394 88,864
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variable dummy = 1 Related events
D1 3/2003–12/2003 2002 Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act
D2 8/1998–10/2000 EC proposing Directive 98/43/EC and European
Court of Justice rejecting it
D3 7/1999–12/1999 Announcement of regulations by the UK Govern-
ment in line with EC Directive 98/43/EC and
the intended imposition of the regulations
D4 10/1999 Richmond brand launched by Imperial Tobacco
D5 2/2003 2002 Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act
Table 3 provides summary information on these variables, and plots
of each firm’s total real advertising expenditure data are provided
in the Appendix. Only ‘Pure Jump’ intervention dummies have been
considered, as inspection of the data suggested no reason for also testing
for the significance of ‘gradually changing’ intervention variables.3
Monthly, rather than quarterly, data were required so that the impact of
proposed legislative changes could be identified more precisely. Clearly,
the analysis does not take account directly of the various other factors
thatmaypartlydeterminefirms’advertisingexpenditures.Thesefactors
are implicitly captured in the autoregressive structure of the estimated
equation. Inspection of the data indicated that in the 1990s, prior to any
advertisingbansbeingproposedbyeithertheUKGovernmentortheEC,
there were no significant changes in firms’ advertising expenditures.
This suggests that bans were not proposed in response to changes in
firms’ advertising strategies in the UK but rather motivated by other
concerns.
• Variable D1 was required, as the UK tobacco advertising levels
couldbeexpectedtofalltozeroafterthe2002TobaccoAdvertising
and Promotion Act came into force, if they had not previously been
reduced in advance of the Act.
• Dummy variable D2 relates to the period between the EC adopting
Directive 98/43/EC on 6 July 1998 and the European Court of
Justicerejectingiton5October2000.NotethatDirective98/43/EC
was initially proposed in 1989 but, if implemented, would not have
come into force until 30 July 2001. Therefore, it was decided to
3 Gradually changing intervention dummy variables also suffer from the disadvantage that
the decision regarding the rate at which the dummy variable increases to unity is somewhat
arbitrary. Enders (2004) details alternative intervention dummies available to researchers.
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use the period between its adoption and rejection by the European
Court of Justice when creating the dummy variable D2 to capture
the period when the threat of its imposition was arguably most
tangible.
• As is to be discussed below, D3 corresponds to the period in 1999
between when the UK Government announced regulations in line
with EC Directive 98/43/EC on 17 June 1999 and the intended
imposition of these regulations on 10 December 1999.
• D4 relates to the month in which Imperial Tobacco launched its




To avoid the possible problem of spurious regression, initially, the
order of integration of the tobacco advertising variable (ADV) needed to
be determined.4 Several statistics can be used for analysing stationarity
(see Table 4). Given the seasonal nature of our data and the possible
presence of structural breaks, we adopted a number of test statistics,
taking into account issues of seasonality, structural break and the panel
structure of our data. The last two decades have seen the development of
anumberofseasonalunitroottests.ThemostpopulararetheHEGYtest
initially developed by Hylleberg et al. (HEGY) (1990) for quarterly data
and later extended by Beaulieu and Miron (1993) to monthly data and
the OCSB test proposed by Osborn et al. (OCSB) (1988). In an analysis
of the performance of these tests for monthly time series, Rodrigues
and Osborn (1999) use the Monte Carlo simulations and show that the
monthly version of the HEGY test is weaker than the OCSB test in terms
of size and power. Both the OCSB test and the revised version of the
HEGY test by Beaulieu and Miron (1993) are conducted and the results
are compared in Table 4.
Perron (1989) points out that both the augmented Dickey–Fuller
(ADF) and the Phillips–Perron (PP) tests have low power when there
is a structural break in the data. To overcome this problem, Perron and
Vogelsang (1992) suggest an asymptotic distribution of a test statistic
that incorporates a structural break explicitly. Zivot and Andrews (ZA)
(1992), among others, develop a method to determine a break point
endogenously and this is the test also used in this study. In the ZA test,
the null hypothesis is that the variable under investigation contains a unit
root with drift that excludes any structural break, while the alternative is
that the series is a trend stationary process with a single break occurring
a priori at an unknown point in time.
4 AllstatisticalanalysiswasundertakenusingEviews(QuantitativeMicroSoftware,Irvine,
CA) and Stata (Statacorp LP, College Station, TX).
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TABLE 4
Unit root test results
Time series unit
root test BAT Gallaher Imperial Philip Morris
ADF −1.276 −5.324∗∗∗ −7.520∗∗∗ −4.569∗∗∗
PP −11.743∗∗∗ −8.674∗∗∗ −7.618∗∗∗ −7.274∗∗∗
OCSB −5.062∗∗∗ −5.169∗∗∗ −5.402∗∗∗ −5.918∗∗∗
HEGY
π 1 = 0 −1.104 −1.780∗∗ −2.794 −1.218
π 2 = 0 −3.692∗∗∗ −2.511∗∗∗ −3.400∗∗∗ −2.668∗∗∗
π 3 = π 4 = 02 .2127 5.410∗∗∗ 12.999∗∗∗ 8.040∗∗∗
π 5 = π 6 = 02 .886∗∗ 4.091∗∗∗ 13.096∗∗∗ 9.044∗∗∗
π 7 = π 8 = 01 0 .711∗∗∗ 11.786∗∗∗ 17.344∗∗∗ 11.025∗∗∗
π 9 = π 10 = 09 .499∗∗∗ 7.954∗∗∗ 15.429∗∗∗ 8.265∗∗∗
π 11 = π 12 = 02 .863∗∗ 9.888∗∗∗ 14.027∗∗∗ 5.441∗∗∗
ZA −14.209∗∗∗ −6.324∗∗∗ −9.081∗∗∗ −5.207∗∗∗




Notes: ∗∗∗ and ∗∗ indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
A sequential test procedure is adopted for all tests. Starting with the most general model
including intercept, trend and, where relevant, seasonal dummies, t- and F-tests are then used
to determine whether they should be included.
Lagged variables are added to whiten the residuals, with the number of lags determined
empirically. Choosing too small a number of lags results in a size bias, while choosing too
large a number of lags results in a loss of power. The criterion used here is to make sure that
the models do not suffer from serial correlation up to the order of 12. Where relevant, the
number of lags was determined by the Akaike information criterion and the Newey–West
bandwidth lags selection used the Bartlett kernel.
Additional information available upon request.
See authors for details of the endogenously determined structural break estimated by the ZA
test.
Itisalsowelldocumentedintheeconometricliteraturethatthepopular
univariate unit root tests, such as the ADF and PP tests, have low
power against the stationary alternative (Maddala and Kim, 1998). More
recently, researchers have begun to favour panel data unit root tests
because extra information can be gained by incorporating the cross-
section dimension. It is often argued that the panel data unit root tests
are more powerful because of increased sample size and the inclusion
of heterogeneous cross-sectional information that is not available in
univariate tests (Maddala and Kim, 1998). Consequently, in this paper,
we also use the panel data unit root tests advocated by Maddala and
Wu (MW) (1999), Levin et al. (LLC) (2002) and Im et al. (IPS)
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(2003).5 Comparing these tests, all three specify the null hypothesis
of unit roots, but the LLC tests a homogeneous alternative in which
every series in the panel is stationary with the same speed of reversion,
while the IPS and MW test a heterogeneous alternative in which at least
one series in the panel is stationary. Maddala and Wu (1999) show that
the MW test is more powerful than the IPS test, which is in turn more
powerful than the LLC test.
Table4presentstheunitroottestingresultsforthetobaccoadvertising
expenditure variable. There is substantial variation in the variable across
the firms. The ADF unit root test results for data series for individual
firms indicate that, with the exception of BAT, all data series are I(0).
The PP test results are largely consistent with the ADF tests, except that
BAT is also found to be I(0). On the other hand, the results of the LLC,
IPS and MW tests all suggest that when data series are pooled together
the variable is I(0). Because the PP test tends to be more robust to a
wide range of serial correlations and time-dependent heteroscedasticity
than the ADF test, and, as discussed above, the panel data unit root tests
are more powerful than the univariate unit root tests, we conclude that
the variable ADV is stationary. This result is confirmed by the ZA test,
while both the OCSB and the HEGY tests indicate that we do not need
to take account of any seasonal unit roots in the data series.
Then, the following system of equations was estimated:
ADVm = αm + Dmβm + Mmγm +  (L) ADVm + εm m = 1,...,4
where α, β and γ are vectors of coefficients; D is a set of dummy
variables to capture the impact of legislation; M is a set of monthly
dummy variables;  (L) is a block diagonal matrix of four cross-sections
and L is a lag operator; εm is the associated T × 1 vector of errors and
T is the time length.
Given that firms may react differently to legislation, the coefficients
were allowed to vary across firms. In addition, it is likely that firms
are affected by their rivals’ strategies. In each firm’s equation, its rivals’
advertising expenditures from lagged period one (i.e., one month) up to
and including lagged period twelve were included. It would seem rea-
sonable to allow for groupwise heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous
correlation in the errors across equations. The weighted least-squares
(WLS) method was considered to account for groupwise heteroscedas-
ticityandtheseeminglyunrelatedregressionestimation(SURE)method
was considered to account for both. To choose between the ordinary
least squares (OLS) and the WLS models, the Bartlett test for equality
of residual variance was performed, and to choose between the OLS
and the SURE models, Breusch and Pagan (1980)’s Lagrange multiplier
5 For a survey, see Maddala and Kim (1998), the 1999 supplement of the Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics and Baltagi (2001).
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(LM) test was carried out. The details of both tests are described in
Judge et al. (1985). The Bartlett test statistic of 663.924, which is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggests that there is
groupwise heteroscedasticity. The LM test statistic of 9.314 was only




III. RESULTS OF INTERVENTION ANALYSIS
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results of the system of equations.
The upper panel of Table 5 reports the results of the intervention
analysis.6 Diagnostictestresultsarepresentedatthebottom,alargeWald
test statistic indicating that the null hypothesis of coefficients jointly
being equal to zero is rejected. The regressions are run by including
monthly dummy variables, as inspection of data plots suggested that
advertising, for at least some of the firms, might vary on a monthly
basis. We believe that this reflects the ‘lumpiness’ of expenditures on
advertising campaigns.7 Testing had previously confirmed the absence
of any moving average component to the data series.
III.1 Results: The impact of legislation
As expected, two out of the four firms, BAT and Gallaher, significantly
reduced advertising once the 2003 UK ban became effective, as sug-
gested by the coefficients on the intervention dummy D1. More inter-
estingly, the coefficients on D2 and D3 suggest that Imperial, Gallaher
and BAT did not significantly change advertising when faced with the
threat of either increased UK or EC tobacco advertising legislation; only
Philip Morris did and reduced advertising in advance of the legisla-
tion becoming effective. This is despite previous findings reviewed in
SectionIthatsuggestthatfirms maybeexpectedeithernottorespondto
future changes in legislation, as the impact of advertising on consumers
is expected to be minimal, or to increase advertising with the intention
of increasing market share at the expense of their rivals.8 Similarly,
an intervention dummy was also introduced to test whether the firms’
6 Note that the equation for each firm includes advertising expenditures of all four firms
in the sample, lagged up to and including twelve lags.
7 The coefficients associated with these monthly dummies are not reported for reasons of
brevity. Similarly, the coefficients associated with the lagged advertising variables are not
reported. Both sets of coefficients are available on request.
8 Note that these results were found to be robust when the regressions were re-estimated
by including D2 and D3 separately.
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TABLE 5
The system of equations results
BAT Gallaher Imperial Philip Morris
Intervention dummy variables
D1 −11,099.810∗∗ −184,211.700∗∗ −65,478.130 −410.050
(−2.439) (−2.114) (−1.036) (−0.018)
D2 2763.185 −50,541.880 50,347.800 −35,509.310∗
(0.701) (−0.669) (0.919) (−1.845)
D3 −1307.100 3621.080 97,823.400 −64,103.210∗∗
(−0.208) (0.030) (1.006) (−2.092)
D4 770,080.800∗∗∗
(4.131)
D5 −658.120 898,553.900∗∗∗ 14,456.420 86,996.090
(−0.055) (3.948) (0.088) (1.500)
Monthly dummies Included Included Included Included
Lagged variables Included Included Included Included
of the firm and
its rivals
¯ R2 0.142 0.629 0.278 0.470
DW 2.044 2.042 1.982 2.172
Wald test statistics
BAT 36.352∗∗∗ 24.795∗∗ 10.450 50.703∗∗∗
Gallaher 13.084 156.618∗∗∗ 24.885∗∗ 29.432∗∗∗
Imperial 6.967 39.311∗∗∗ 47.512∗∗∗ 40.085∗∗∗
Philip Morris 17.107 16.176 19.936∗ 40.055∗∗∗
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Figures in parentheses are t-values.
The Wald tests are used to test the null hypothesis that the lagged variables of the named firm
are jointly equal to zero.
advertising expenditures changed in the period between the later UK
legislation being approved in 2002 and becoming effective in 2003, but
the coefficient associated with this dummy was never significant at the
5 percent level or below and so the variable was dropped.9 Hence,
it appears that most firms’ advertising strategies were typically not
influenced by a threatened toughening of the EC or UK legislation.
Furthermore, from inspection of a plot of Imperial’s advertising, a
very large increase in advertising in the single month of October 1999
is apparent, this change being captured by the intervention dummy D4.
None of the other firms significantly changed advertising in October
1999,thisbeingconfirmedbothbyinspectionoftheiradvertisingexpen-
ditures and by re-running the regressions with D4 added as an additional
9 ThedummyvariabletookthevalueunitybetweenthemonthsofApril2002andFebruary
2003 inclusive, reflecting the period between when the Act was passed through Parliament
and when it came into force on 14 February 2003. If coefficients on this variable were found
to be significantly different from zero, this would have indicated that firms adjusted their
advertising expenditures when faced with the future enforcement of the legislation.
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explanatory variable for each ADV variable. The increase in advertising
by Imperial reflects the introduction and roll out of the Richmond
brand by Imperial Tobacco in September 1999, and Project Dolphin
documentation indicates that the brand launch was brought forward so
thatbrandadvertisingcouldbecarriedoutpriortotheplannedbaninthe
UK on advertising in December 1999 (http://www.tobaccopapers.com).
Similarly, Gallaher significantly increased advertising in the final two
weeks in February 2003 when advertising was still permitted. This
short-term increase in advertising, captured by the intervention dummy
D5, reflects Gallaher’s decision to introduce a new brand prior to the
advertising ban coming into force, as reported by Tylee (2003).
Hence, the tobacco industry advertising as a whole does not appear to
be systematically affected by the threat of future UK or EC advertising
legislation. Rather, responses in general advertising strategy have been
either insignificant or restricted to a single firm. It has been previously
suggested in the literature that tobacco advertising may not have a
significant impact on market demand. If this result is accepted, then
the lack of response of firms to threatened legislation may be a profit-
maximizing strategy. Nevertheless, the results indicate that prospective
UK legislation may affect individual leading firms’ product launch and
associated advertising strategies, again a potentially profit-maximizing
response if it is believed that product launches can be successful preda-
tory devices (Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990).
III.2 Results: Firm interdependencies
The empirical results of Table 5 and particularly the Wald test statistics
in the bottom panel suggest non-zero conjectural variations between the
firms, although the response of the firms to the advertising strategy
choices of their rivals differs. Considering BAT first, its advertising
expenditures are influenced by its previous advertising levels, but it
appears to be the firm least influenced by its rivals’ UK advertising
expenditures.Meanwhile,theadvertisingexpendituresoftheotherfirms
in the UK market appear to be influenced to a much greater extent by the
advertising levels chosen by their rival firms in the UK market. So far,
theseresultsappearinlinewiththeUSresultsofRobertsandSamuelson
(1988),whoconcludethattherearesignificantnon-zeroadvertisingcon-
jectural variations between firms in the US tobacco industry. However,
Roberts and Samuelson (1988) find negative conjectural variations, i.e.,
one firm’s advertising reduces future values of its rivals’ advertising,
whereas in our results there is a mix of positive and negative significant
coefficients, at the 10 percent significance level at least. Nevertheless,
Roberts and Samuelson (1988) find that tobacco advertising primarily
increasesmarketdemand,whereasfirmscompeteformarketshareusing
thenumberofbrandsproduced.Ourresultthatfirmsincreasethenumber
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ofbrandswhenfacingfurtheradvertisingrestrictionsfitswiththenotion
thatfirmsusethenumberofbrandstohelpthemcompeteeffectively.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This research set out to investigate whether firms in the UK tobacco
market significantly changed their advertising expenditure in the face of
proposedchangestotheUKandECtobaccoadvertisinglegislation.The
results are perhaps surprising. The firms typically did not respond to the
threatofatougheningintheUKorEClegislation,eitherinthelate1990s
or in 2002. However, if firms were already considering the introduction
of a new brand when further legislation was proposed at either the UK
or the EC level, the results above reflect these firms bringing forward
product launches so that extensive advertising could be undertaken prior
to advertising bans coming into force.
Theresearchconcludesthatcompaniesdonottypicallyincreaseadver-
tising of existing brands when facing the threat of tougher advertising
restrictions. Nevertheless, firms’ brand launch decisions do seem to
be influenced by the threat of future advertising legislation, again this
seeming to be sensible if, as Roberts and Samuelson (1988) conclude,
tobacco companies use product launches to compete effectively against
their rivals. New products are often believed to enjoy relatively high
advertising elasticities of demand in comparison to mature products.
The advertising of new products can then be expected to result in market
share shifts in favour of the new products. The notion that firms in the
UK tobacco market make advertising decisions interdependently was
also confirmed, as the results suggested that each of the four firms’
advertising expenditures were partly determined by the past advertising
expenditures of their rivals.
Future research could include modelling the implications of tobacco
advertising bans on other strategic variables chosen by firms. For exam-
ple, Becker et al. (1994) suggest that advertising restrictions will lead
to higher prices, including current prices, as ‘...the decline in future
demand that they cause reduces the gains from maintaining a lower price
to stimulate future consumption’. In addition, work still needs to be
undertaken to understand tobacco companies’ international advertising
and marketing strategies. Does the implementation of tougher adver-
tising legislation in certain countries result in firms enjoying lower
marketing costs, or are advertising expenditures redirected towards
countries with lighter advertising restrictions? The impact on tobacco
companies of an increasing number of countries signing the 2003 World
Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control should
then also be considered.
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Fig. A2. Gallaher real advertising expenditure.
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Fig. A4. Philip Morris real advertising expenditure.
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